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is considerable distance. This chapter accepts the problem of meaning as more urgent than the problem of
happiness. For over against the hopeful prescriptions for the integration of the personality and of social life
through religion there stands the experience of disintegration of the structure of past confidence. Desperately,
theologians wrestle with ancient symbols to wrest from them new significance or reference, or attempt to
revivify their lost meaning and powers of evocation. In these critical times theological thought attempts to
referee the contest between the lost soul and the powerful chaos of world history. In an intellectual landscape
scarred by war, diplomatic failure, economic uncertainty, and a wide variety of psychic traumata, theologians
probe the private egos, society, and even language itself to reestablish meaning. [excerpt]
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2, Meaning as a Problem in
Contemporary Religious Thought

To judge from the public voice and countenance of religion
in America at least, there is a preoccupation in religion with
happiness at the expense of meaning. But between the two poles
of happiness and meaning there is considerable distance. This
chapter accepts the problem of meaning as more urgent than the
problem of happiness. For over against the hopeful prescrip
tions for the integration of the personality and of social life
through religion there stands the experience of disintegration
of the structure of past confidence. Desperately, theologians
wrestle with ancient symbols to wrest from them new significance
or reference, or attempt to revivify their lost meaning and
powers of evocation. In these critical times theological
thought attempts to referee the contest between the lost soul
and the powerful chaos of world history. In an intellectual
landscape scarred by war, diplomatic failure, economic uncer
tainty, and a wide variety of psychic traumata, theologians
probe the private egos, society, and even language itself to re
establish meaning.
The consideration of meaning as a problem may at first seem
to be an effort to make intentional confusion for human thought.
Figuratively it may seem as though the dog of the mind is chas
ing its own tail. And if it occasionally makes a successful
grab, it stops short to stand embarrassed at its own frivolity.
For eventually this special pursuit will result in a most baf
fling question: What is the meaning of meaning? To minds al
ready distraught by mushroom clouds and cold wars, this must
appear as the reduction of human intellectual effort to ultimate
fruitlessness. Man has become,preoccupied, so it seems, with
the last logical question, one to which there can be no satis
factory answer. After all, such a question must be answered in
the same kinds of words and phrases and out of the same mental
structures that pose it in the first place. Hence, this is the
question, so it seems, which will remain as a question forever,
although what men now require are answers. The philosopher has
stopped to examine his ideas and methods, indeed to dissect
them; and runs the risk that he will not be able to put his in
struments (words, ideas, data) back together again. Hence
philosophy itself may seem to be not only in court, but already
in a hopeless prison. The guards blocking escape have these
questions for weapons: What trustworthy purpose for life can
you claim? What do your statements signify? What is the nature
of truth? This is to say again that the question of meaning
now occupies the forefront of intellectual activity.
This question of meaning challenges not only philosophy in
general but theology in particular, and theology has taken the
challenge. The problem of meaning, however, does not mark a
novel effort for theology. In Augustine's historic inquiry into
the nature of the Trinity one finds, in effect, an example of
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early concern for the problem of meaning in one of its forms.
Though Augustine here as elsewhere finally becomes rhetorical
about the mystery, he does try to show the analogical charac
ter of the doctrine: The unitary mind that knows, wills, and
remembers is analogous to God who creates, sustains, and re
deems, as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
But since the beginning of modern science in the seven
teenth century, a severe restatement of the problem of meaning
has been in the making. Actually, however, the foreshadowing
of the conflict between science and religion can be noted as
early as the sixth century of Greek thought. The horrendous
symbol of modern science, the mushroom cloud, must wait 2500
years for its first show. Yet an eminent physicist, Erwin
Schrodinger, claims that science has thought about the world in
the Greek way. Learning from this "Greek way" science once of
fered two hypotheses for its kind of inquiry: first, that
nature is intelligible, that it can be understood; and second,
that the observer can be removed from the aspect of nature that
is being examined. This second hypothesis is of first impor
tance for this essay.
When the scientist following, for example, Aristotle makes
his inquiry into the empirical world, he treats nature as an
object. To be concerned with an objectified field of observa
tion is simply to be concerned with something other than the
salvation of the soul or one's relationship with God or the
mystery of creation. These last concerns cannot allow the sub
ject to be removed without destroying their peculiar status.
Religious faith forces the person back into the picture. If in
science there is no room for this kind of subjective concern,
then there is a conflict between science and religion. One way
to attempt solution of the conflict is through the problem of
meaning. For, as we shall explain later, this is the problem
of the relationship between he who knows and what is known.
But even the first basic hypothesis of science (that nature
is intelligible) offers a fundamental challenge to theological
statements. For the God of the Judeo-Christian tradition is a
mystery in the same way and for the same reasons that anything
holy is a mystery. He speaks out of the burning bush to Moses
and with little subtlety thrusts visions and compulsive speeches
upon the prophets. The New Testament revels in paradoxes, the
luxuriant flower of mystery: The Word becomes flesh and the Son
of God dies that man might have life. These are not claims that
rest upon the scrutability of nature. In fact, they seem to
have little to do with nature at all. They are rather claims
about history, which is in effect the drama of the interaction
of men. Certainly any attempt to record this drama with objec
tive clarity is difficult. In the nature of the case the field
of inquiry itself is marked by many traps, obscurities, and
lacunae. It may be possible to suggest that history is more of
a mystery than nature, that history is not intelligible as an
object. This is not to argue finally that history may not
either have or be given meaning. In fact, this is how religious
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scriptures deal with real or imaginary events. But by so doing,
nothing of the mystery of God is eliminated. It seems then that
theological thought must assert itself against the rigidity of
empirical inquiry. For it cannot likely discover any method of
analysis or kind of statement that will illuminate completely
the mystery of the divine reality. Theology must always claim
a residuum of human experience that does not submit completely
to the Greek way of thinking.
So even theology has taken up the problem of meaning. The
consequences could well be devastating when the question is
asked: What means God? For it appears that when answers are
ventured, they too will be subjected to the relentless power of
the continuous question of meaning. The future then may honor,
not faith, but a dramatic and frustrated skepticism. Indeed one
contemporary theologian-philosopher, Paul Tillich, has recast
Luther's famous Biblical phrase to the effect that we are justi
fied by doubt and not by faith as conventionally understood.
Still theology has been obliged to accept the challenge of this
question of meaning. The dilemma is deep. Theology has, how
ever, with various degrees of caution accepted philosophy's lead
But before the separate responses are illustrated and re
viewed, we had best sharpen the problem itself. In what sense
can meaning be a problem for contemporary theology?
The old claim that religion gives meaning to life implied
quite simply that with faith in God the Father life somehow
seemed worthwhile. The rational disposition that we have to
deal with today will not easily accept such subjective senti
ments. The problem of meaning does not begin or end with such
feeble ejaculations. But what, then, is the character of the
theological concern for meaning?
Perhaps the problem can be stated thus for theology: To
ask the question of meaning is to ask about the relationship
between the knower and the known. The following illustration
may help. In the book of worship of a large Protestant denomi
nation is this sentence in the communion ritual:
"We have to
do here not with signs merely, but with the reality that these
signs represent." The reference is to the bread and wine. In
Roman Catholic ritual there is neither place nor reason for
such self-conscious rjeservation about the elements. They do
not remain symbols at all; they become the realities of body
and blood. But in the Protestant recitation the bread remains
the representation of flesh and the wine the representation of
blood. Here the mind shifts into an analytic gear. The di
rect dramatic quality of the ritual succumbs to an implicitly
rational analysis not only of the act itself but also of the
actors, the worshipping believers. For a secret question
hovers behind the innocent ritual. What do the bread and wine
mean? The implication is that they are not what they are of
fered as. The elements are not body and blood in a literal
sense; they represent body and blood. And we see the subtle
separation of symbol from that which is symbolized. In our

XXIII

p. 7

previous terms, the knower (the worshipper) and the known (the
bread and wine) are separated by the intervention of a covert
objectivity. Hence the question: What does the communion mean
to the worshipper? It is no longer a simple and direct act of
identification with the God-man who dies carrying the sin of
the world in his own person. But to say what it is not does not
say what it does mean. In what precise relationship does the
knower stand to the known?
Theological inquiry does not pose the problem of meaning
in the same way that semantics poses the problem. For in this
relatively new branch of logic there is no explicit reference
to the users of the symbols under study and hence meaning re
mains an objective matter. But the theological solutions to
the problem of meaning will always have peculiar personal or
existential bias. That is, the whole intellectual effort
begins, though it does not necessarily end, with the subject,
with the one in whom religious experience and knowledge occurs.
In the following pages are illustrations of six different
theological ways of dealing with the problem of meaning thus
conceived. The first two, Kierkegaard and Barth, try to show
that the relationship between God and man is controlled from
God's side. For Kierkegaard, meaning can be affirmed if a man
first knows himself to be confronted by God in Christ. But
this element of subjectivity is played down in Barth. For him
significance and truth are radically given into life by God.
Martin Buber proposes that meaning is discovered in those mo
mentary relationships in which the armor of familiarity is
penetrated and the soul is stirred to new sensibility and re
sponse, These are three existentialist approaches to the prob
lem of meaning. For these men a certain attitude is necessary
if purpose, truth, or significance is to be confirmed in
human experience.
The contemporary school of analytical philosophy has made
excursions into theology. A discussion of religious language
provides an interesting illustration of this recent effort to
wed a new philosophy with an historic theology. Ian Ramsey
tries to establish what theological statements and words in
fact mean, that is, what they signify. Striding over all the
territory of theological and philosophical thought, Paul Tillich
attempts with inclusive argument to show that all man's concerns
a.re ultimately related to his status as a religious being. The
problem of meaning for Tillich evokes simultaneously the ques
tions of purpose, truth, and significance. Last in the s'feries
is Charles Hartshorne. He provides meaning for all the data of
human experience by organizing them into a coherent, inclusive
whole.
Excitement and anguish, adventure and doubt seem to be new
virtues for men of religion who demand and seek for meaning.

